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Abstract 
TO FIGHT OR TO VOTE: Sovereignty Referendums as Strategies in Con-
flicts over Self-Determination 
 
 
by Friederike Luise Kelle and Mitja Sienknecht* 
Subnational groups employ a variety of strategies to contest governments. While demo-
cratic states offer a broader array of accessible options, autocratic regimes are more diffi-
cult to contest via conventional means. Why do subnational groups stage sovereignty ref-
erendums across regime types? Our argument is that public votes over greater autonomy 
or independence signal adherence to international democratic norms and the legitimacy 
of the demand towards three audiences: the state, the domestic population, and the inter-
national community. Self-determination groups seek to gain support from their domestic 
constituency as well as the international community in order to pressure the state gov-
ernment into granting concessions. We introduce a new dataset of referendums and inter-
national diplomacy by subnational self-determination groups on a global scale between 
1990 and 2015. We supplement the descriptive evidence and assess the plausibility of the 
proposed mechanism with an out-of-sample case of an in-sample observation, the 2017 
independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. We show that referendums are indeed asso-
ciated with international diplomacy and domestic state building by self-determination 
groups, suggesting that both tools are critical for the choice of conventional strategies 
across regime types. 
Keywords: self-determination, conflict, referendum, rebel diplomacy, domestic institution 
building 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*  The authors thank Hyeran Jo and Joseph M. Brown for excellent comments on the paper, as well 
as Jakob Angeli, Paul Collins, Johannes Scherzinger, Jordan Strayer, and Marek Wenz for very able 
research assistance. The paper was presented at the annual meeting of the European Political Sci-
ence Association in 2019. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Kämpfen oder Abstimmen? Souveränitätsreferenden als Strategien in 
Konflikten über Selbstbestimmung 
 
 
von Friederike Luise Kelle und Mitja Sienknecht* 
Subnationale Gruppen verwenden eine Vielzahl von Strategien bei der Verfolgung ihrer 
Forderungen gegenüber der Regierung. Während demokratische Staaten zahlreiche Hand-
lungsoptionen für Gruppen bereithalten, ist es in autokratischen Regimen schwieriger, die 
Politik auf konventionellem Wege anzufechten. Warum führen subnationale Gruppen Refe-
renden in unterschiedlichen Regimetypen durch? Unser Argument ist, dass Referenden 
(über größere Autonomie oder Unabhängigkeit) die Einhaltung internationaler demokrati-
scher Normen und die Legitimität der Forderungen gegenüber drei Zielgruppen – dem 
Staat, der Gruppenpopulation und der internationalen Gemeinschaft – signalisiert. Selbst-
bestimmungsgruppen versuchen, die Unterstützung von Gruppenangehörigen und der 
internationalen Gemeinschaft zu sichern um die Regierung zu Zugeständnissen zu bewe-
gen. Wir stellen einen neuen Datensatz vor, der Referenden und internationale Diplomatie 
von subnationalen Selbstbestimmungsgruppen auf globaler Ebene zwischen 1990 und 
2015 erhebt. Wir ergänzen die deskriptive Datenanalyse und testen die Plausibilität des 
vorgeschlagenen Mechanismus mithilfe des kurdischen Unabhängigkeitsreferendums im 
Nordirak in 2017, einer Beobachtung eines Falles aus dem Datensatz, aber außerhalb des 
Analysezeitraums. Wir zeigen, dass Referenden in der Tat mit internationaler Diplomatie 
und der Einrichtung substaatlicher Institutionen verbunden sind, was darauf hinweist, 
dass beide Strategien wesentlich sind für die Wahl konventioneller Strategien über Re-
gimetypen hinweg. 
Stichworte: Selbstbestimmung, Konflikt, Referendum, Rebellendiplomatie, Aufbau substaatli-
cher Institutionen
                                                 
*  Die Autorinnen danken Hyeran Jo und Joseph M. Brown für ihre hervorragenden Kommentare zu 
diesem Beitrag; sowie Jakob Angeli, Paul Collins, Johannes Scherzinger, Jordan Strayer und Marek 
Wenz für ihre kompetente Forschungsassistenz. Der Beitrag wurde auf dem jährlichen Treffen der 
European Political Science Association 2019 präsentiert. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the history of the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi authorities, 
the Kurds have resorted to both violence and conventional politics to achieve their goal of 
independence from the Iraqi state.1 Since the end of World War II the Kurds had been em-
broiled in an armed struggle with the Iraqi government, marked with alternating periods 
of cooperation. The first Kurdish autonomy arrangement was established in 1970, but last-
ed only until 1974 when the Iraqi government reneged on the agreement, leading to a 
renewed war between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. In the 1990s, the Kurds devel-
oped strong ties to international allies, such as the U.S, that enabled the unilateral founda-
tion of a de-facto Kurdish state in the North of Iraq. In the aftermath of the international 
invasion of Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, this au-
tonomy was institutionalized and inscribed in the Constitution of Iraq. In 2017, when the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was almost beaten by the combined mission of Kurd-
ish Peshmerga and an International Alliance, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) con-
ducted a unilateral independence referendum that uncovered a high level of support for 
an independent Kurdish state (Kaplan, 2019). Kurdish officials expected the support of the 
international community, but this episode resulted once again in a violent conflict with 
the Iraqi government and the non-recognition of the referendum – both on the national 
and international level (O’Driscoll & Baser, 2019, p. 2). 
Similar to the Iraqi Kurds, many subnational groups conduct sovereignty referen-
dums on their political status in order to achieve greater autonomy or even independence 
from the central state. While separatist conflicts are among the most protracted and dead-
ly (Gurr, 2000, p. 276), not all subnational groups choose to conduct political polls about 
their future. Why do subnational groups stage sovereignty referendums across regime 
types?  
                                                 
1 The Kurdish population lives divided in four states: Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. It is the fourth-
largest ethnic group in the Middle East with around 40 million people. The Kurds faced and mostly 
still face in all four countries a policy of subjugation and repression out of fear of Kurdish uprisings 
and separationist movements (Jongerden 2019). In Turkey, Kurdish groups entered the Turkish polit-
ical party system and work from within the system to gain more rights. In Iran, the political organi-
zation of Kurdish groups is mainly oppressed by the Iranian regime. In light of the war in Syria, 
Kurdish groups were able to build-up an autonomous administration of North and East Syria, also 
known as Rojava. In the turmoil of the war, they established a form of self-governance without ask-
ing the Syrian government for permission. Kurdish groups used different strategies in the four 
states. This study will focus on the Iraqi Kurds. 
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We argue that subnational groups that seek autonomy or independence from the cen-
tral state through a referendum exert pressure on the national government by securing 
support from both domestic and international audiences. The national level is the primary 
audience groups aim to signal with a referendum, given the fact that greater autonomy or 
independence can only be granted by the national government.2 Referendums show that 
the impetus for independence is not exclusively expressing the will of the elite, but repre-
sentative of broad common consensus seeking greater self-rule. At the same time, they 
demonstrate resolve in the fight for greater subnational sovereignty or independence, 
garnering the support by a broad constituent base. Where domestic and international au-
diences embrace the bid for self-determination, we argue, referendums are more likely to 
be an attractive strategy for self-determination groups. Therefore, we expect that groups 
seek to strengthen the local and international structures in order to create pressure – 
from above and below – on the national government.  
How do subnational groups garner leverage in their bid for sovereignty, thereby 
making the call for a referendum more likely? We argue that the combination of domestic 
governance structures and international diplomacy serve to maximize the signaling value 
of referendums towards the government. On the one hand, groups build up local govern-
ance structures, including social services like health care, education, and taxes. These 
structures increase the perceived legitimacy of the group towards the regional constituen-
cy while demonstrating the capacity and ability “to get things done”. On the other hand, 
we claim that being in good standing with decisive actors in the international arena helps 
to overcome the asymmetric relationship between the group and the national govern-
ment. International diplomacy signals towards the international community that, in line 
with existing members of the state system, groups have internalized prevalent (democrat-
ic) norms and values and incorporated decision-making tools involving public opinion. As 
the international community plays a decisive role in supporting claims for autonomy and 
independence, subnational groups go to great lengths in order to develop diplomacy struc-
tures with international actors. In this paper, we focus on the establishment of diplomatic 
structures of subnational groups.  
                                                 
2 Exceptions include Kosovo, where the Serbian government did not accept the separation of Kosovo 
from the core state, while some members of the international community recognized it as an inde-
pendent state. 
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This is the first study to link the employment of sovereignty referendums to the stra-
tegic calculations of subnational self-determination groups regarding their political status 
in the national and international realm in a large scale, comparative setting. This allows us 
to make sense of the interactions between the subnational, national, and international 
levels in accounting for sovereignty referendums on a global scale. Furthermore, we are 
able to identify which functions referendums fulfill for groups in their pursuit of autono-
my or independence. Our argument speaks to the literature on the success of self-
determination demands, referendum use, and diplomacy by non-state actors. First, we 
relate to debates in the literature on state birth and subnational demands for self-
determination. While the role of diplomacy by subnational groups for recognition and in-
volvement by external actors has received attention (Fazal & Griffiths, 2014; Petrova, 
2019), we know little about the importance of referendums in this process. Second, exist-
ing research on referendums over sovereignty focuses mostly on the domestic determi-
nants of referendums (Butler & Ranney, 1994; Qvortrup, 2014c). However, referendums 
might be used strategically to signal eligibility for membership in the international com-
munity, despite groups being fully aware that the often unilateral referendum will not 
lead automatically to full independence (O’Discroll 2019, p. 6). Third, our research relates 
to the rebel governance literature, which deals with the fact that rebel groups build up 
state-like governance structures (Arjona et al. 2015) and develop diplomacy structures 
linking them to actors of the world political system (Huang 2016). While extant work has 
demonstrated that rebel groups striving for secession conduct diplomatic relations more 
often, we know little about non-armed self-determination groups and their choice of 
strategy. 
To substantiate the proposed mechanism, we introduce new data on the diplomatic 
actions and the use of sovereignty referendums by 149 subnational groups demanding 
autonomy or independence in 79 countries in the period from 1990 to 2015. The quantita-
tive comparative data allows us to assess global patterns. In order to assess the external 
validity of the mechanism we select a typical case from the sample, Iraqi Kurdistan, and 
assess the proposed mechanism for an out-of-sample observation, the 2017 independence 
referendum. We thus complement our descriptive analysis of global patterns of referen-
dum use with evidence from the case of the Kurdistan region relating to the referendum 
in 2017. For the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the referendum was a way to signal 
their claim to statehood to the Iraqi state and the group’s followers, as well as towards the 
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international community through emphasis on the democratic constitution and relative 
stability of the Kurds in a democratizing, but war-torn Iraq.   
We proceed by, first, reviewing the state of the literature on subnational self-
determination demands, rebel diplomacy, and sovereignty referendums. We then develop 
our argument, which we assess following the introduction and description of our quanti-
tative and qualitative data. We close by jointly discussing the insights derived from the 
two analytical steps, as well as highlighting potential for future research. 
2. State of the Literature 
Our argument speaks to the literatures on the success of self-determination demands, 
referendum use, and diplomacy by non-state actors. In this section, we briefly review the 
existing literature in these three areas, and clarify our definitions of core terms. 
2.1. Self-Determination 
We define self-determination groups as “a group of people that shares a collective identity 
and believes it has a legitimate right to self-rule” (Cunningham, 2014, p. 13). The de-
mands3 of these groups have different scopes, ranging from autonomy over specific issue 
areas, such as taxation or culture, to substantial changes in the structure of governmental 
decision-making, for instance through the devolution of governmental sovereignty to 
regional parliaments. In most cases, a range of demands is expressed by different interest 
groups claiming to represent collective interests. We distinguish between demands for 
autonomy versus independence or secession as distinct subtypes with different scopes.4 
Groups pursue different strategies to gain self-determination, ranging from conventional 
                                                 
3 We use the terms demands for self-determination, separatism, self-rule, greater rights, and chal-
lenges to national sovereignty synonymously. 
4 We refer to self-determination as a demand for sovereignty vis-à-vis the home state. Decoloniza-
tion is thus excluded from the analysis as a special type of self-determination-demand. All challeng-
es for self-rule in the twentieth century operate in an environment of rapid change of the interna-
tional system, pertaining for instance to the security, economic, and norm environment (Fazal & 
Griffiths, 2014). However, decolonization movements benefitted particularly from the endorsement 
of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which establishes the right to inde-
pendence of colonial countries and peoples. This right is invoked continually until today, as the rul-
ing of the ICJ in the case of the Chagos Islands in February 2019 illustrates (Bowcott, 2019). Former 
colonial states thus face different strategic concerns when seeking independence, compared to non-
colonial units.  
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politics5, such as party formation or lobbying, to large scale insurgencies (Cunningham, 
2013b). The presence of group spoilers (Cunningham, 2013a), exclusion from executive 
decision making at the national level (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010), the loss of auton-
omy (Siroky & Cuffe, 2015), and the presence of symbolic territorial attachments (Kelle, 
2019a) increase the likelihood that demands escalate. 
The quest of subnational groups seeking statehood or greater autonomy has attracted 
a significant degree of scholarly attention in different subfields. Global changes in the 
security, economic, and normative international environment have increased benefits of 
independence that clearly outweigh the costs of statehood, particularly since the end of 
the Second World War (Fazal & Griffiths, 2014). The potential for membership in multilat-
eral organizations, such as NATO, might reduce the costs for security, while economic or-
ganizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or European Union (EU), may 
supply economic benefits. Moreover, the integration and institutionalization of the world 
political system has been accompanied by a transformation of the international policy of 
recognition. The fact that the right to self-determination is, in principle, acknowledged by 
the international community as well as in international law has encouraged groups all 
over the world to strive for independence (Wolff, 2008). State leaders recognize would-be-
states strategically in coordination with other system members in order to maximize their 
internal and external security (Coggins, 2011). At the same time, separatist regions that 
correspond to unique administrative units and feature clearly identifiable administrative 
boundaries are more likely to become independent (Griffiths, 2015). Special administrative 
status, obtained through bargaining with the central government and potentially in a ref-
erendum, is thus desirable for would-be states. 
2.2. Sovereignty Referendums 
Referendums are a global decision making tool employed across regime types, which has 
received significant attention in the comparative politics literature (Butler & Ranney, 
1994; Qvortrup, 2014b). We define sovereignty referendums as “any popular vote on [a 
reallocation of sovereignty between at least two territorial centers] that is organized by 
the state or at least by a state-like entity, such as the authorities of a de facto state”, where 
                                                 
5 Conventional politics subsumes electoral politics alongside other approaches such as legal re-
course. From this we distinguish nonconventional politics, which might be violent or nonviolent (cf. 
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sovereignty is “the right to make authoritative political decisions within a territorial unit” 
(Mendez & Germann, 2016a, pp. 4-5). We include public votes for greater sovereignty on 
the national level, where existing territorial political entities aim at an independent state 
or greater regional sovereignty within the host state. This includes both territories, which 
already enjoy a degree of regional autonomy and strive either for greater autonomy or for 
independence, as well as those substate units seeking to establish some form of self-
governance.  
Most of the literature focuses on the domestic conditions of sovereignty referendums 
(see, for instance, Butler & Ranney, 1994; Qvortrup, 2014c). Research in the context of sub-
national ethnic conflict (Qvortrup, 2014a) distinguishes between difference-managing 
referendums on devolution or power-sharing on the one hand and referendums geared 
towards secession or partition on the other hand. Difference-managing referendums are 
conducted where politicians are under electoral threat stemming from limited legitimacy 
of political decision making. Democratic institutions increase competition, which fosters 
processes of collective decision making (Qvortrup, 2014a, p. 46). Secessionist referendums, 
on the other hand, often occur in waves that correlate with moments of instability in the 
international system. While in isolated cases referendums have contributed to (further) 
escalation of conflict, such as in former Yugoslavia, war is more the exception than the 
rule (Qvortrup, 2014c). In fact, where referendums are following negotiation processes and 
are endorsed by the international community, war is less likely (Qvortrup, 2014a, p. 68). 
2.3. (Rebel) Governance and Diplomacy   
The rebel governance and diplomacy literature addresses the strategies and incentives of 
rebel groups that build state-like governance structures (Arjona et al. 2015) and develop 
diplomacy structures with international actors (Huang, 2016; Sienknecht, 2019). The 
emerging field of studies analyzing (rebel) group politics mostly focuses on governance 
approaches at the local level (Arjona, Kasfir, & Mampilly, 2015; Coggins, 2015). Groups fre-
quently build up state-like governance structures to achieve their goals. In case of conflict 
situations, this has been referred to as “rebel governance” (Arjona et al., 2015, p. 1). By 
establishing governance structures, rebel groups can increase their acceptance by the ci-
vilian population and even build up de facto state-structures. Through this, the respective 
                                                                                                                                               
Cunningham, 2013b, p. 292). 
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group contributes to its legitimacy on the subnational level as it provides the respective 
public with needed infrastructure and security. Such de facto states, which experience a 
degree of autonomy from the central government but are missing recognition as a sover-
eign state, can survive quite long, in spite of weak economies and state structures, due to 
strong domestic support (Kolstø, 2006). Besides this politics on the subnational level, more 
recent studies have demonstrated that many groups also conduct foreign relations to 
members of the international community (e.g. Coggins, 2015; Huang, 2016; Sienknecht, 
2018; Sienknecht, 2019).  
The concept of “rebel diplomacy” (Coggins, 2015; Huang, 2016) captures the diplomatic 
relations of rebel groups towards international actors. Via diplomacy, rebel groups signal 
to international audiences that they are serious political contenders for state power 
(Huang, 2016, p. 91). This does not only hold true for rebel groups in conflict with a gov-
ernment, but also for peaceful groups, as we can see in the case of international relations 
of Scotland or Catalonia. Therefore, we define non-state diplomacy as a form of engage-
ment by subnational groups to build up relations to external actors, such as states and IOs, 
with the aim to gain support and legitimacy for their cause.6 
3. Theoretical Argument: Referendums as signaling tools 
How do subnational groups actively promote their bid for autonomy or independence? 
What role do the varying audiences with which they interact play? We offer the first com-
prehensive theory to integrate the use of referendums over self-determination into the 
strategic considerations of subnational groups. We argue that groups are more likely to 
stage referendums if they can benefit from the signaling effects of international diploma-
cy and local governance structures. On the state level, the national government is, in the 
vast majority of cases, the only actor that is effectively able to grant territorial autonomy 
or independence to a restive subnational population. We therefore claim that the state is 
the main receiving audience of groups’ political activities. It is, however, not the only au-
dience towards which groups have incentives to signal their capacity and legitimacy. Both 
the international community and the domestic audience are important forces that can 
potentially exert pressure on the government. The establishment of subnational govern-
                                                 
6 In this paper, we will focus on diplomatic relations to IOs and states. Apart from those relations, 
subnational groups conduct transnational ties to other groups, NGOs, diasporas, etc. 
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ance structures and the employment of international diplomacy are thus facilitating fac-
tors that make the approval of the government more likely. As a result, subnational 
groups will be more likely to employ referendums to gain greater leverage towards all 
three audiences when they are able to build on domestic governance structures and tools 
of international diplomacy. We explicate this mechanism below, deriving expectations 
regarding the role of the three audiences in the choice of self-determination referendums. 
3.1. State Audience 
States are the guardians of sovereignty over their territory. While the origins of the mod-
ern state system can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, the norm of terri-
torial integrity emerged at the end of the First World War and was widely accepted follow-
ing the Second World War. The UN Charter of 1945 marks the norm’s acceptance by system 
members (Zacher, 2001, pp. 216-237). States accept the territorial integrity norm for idea-
tional and instrumental reasons: the threat of territorial revisionism, the decline of wars 
over post-colonial borders, and the incentives of the globalizing economy are among the 
core motivations (Zacher, 2001, pp. 237-244). Conversely, the self-determination norm, 
established in 1918, fueled a demand for secessionism by subnational groups, which has 
not been reflected in states’ willingness to grant independence (Griffiths, 2014, pp. 579-
580).  
How do restive regions obtain sovereignty? Generally speaking, “obtaining the con-
sent of the central government is the surest way to independence” (Griffiths, 2014, p. 580). 
Ironically, states are more likely to grant independence to restive regions since the estab-
lishment of the territorial integrity norm. The state system seeks to maintain political 
borders, while at the same time largely shielding its members from territorial aggression. 
The resulting increase in a state’s security reduces the incentives to control large territo-
ries (Griffiths, 2014, pp. 566-567). The territorial integrity norm is, however, only one fac-
tor contributing to an increased willingness of sovereign states to allow secessions from 
their territory after 1945 (Griffiths, 2014, pp. 559-560). The possibility of stable interna-
tional collaboration stemming from the bipolar, and later unipolar, character of the state 
system reduces the appeal of large state territories and economies. Moreover, states no 
longer require extensive territories to secure economic power and security, due to the 
emergence of economic globalization and the advent of the nuclear age. Moreover, sepa-
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ratist regions that correspond to unique administrative units and feature clearly identifi-
able administrative boundaries are more likely to become independent – an effective way 
for states to avoid costly conflict while minimizing the risk of precedent setting towards 
other potential claimants (Griffiths, 2015). Special administrative status, obtained through 
bargaining with the central government and potentially in a referendum, is thus desirable 
for would-be states. 
The need to appeal to the central government holds true independent of the scope of 
the demands subnational groups put forth. Whether it is a maximalist demand for inde-
pendent statehood, or more narrow claims for limited territorial autonomy: Either way, it 
is the state, as the sovereign over the territory, who may or may not grant greater rights. 
Referendums are an attractive tool for separatist groups to gain the consent of govern-
ments: They signal the high organizational capacity of the group and legitimacy of the 
demand, independent of the scope of the demand. Two recent referendums illustrate the 
appeal of bilaterally agreed referendums in situations with different degrees of radical-
ism. The referendum in Bougainville in late 2019, which asked voters to choose between 
autonomy or independence from Papua New Guinea, exemplifies a vote with potentially 
wide-ranging scope. The 2017 referendums in the Italian regions of Lombardy and Veneto, 
on the other hand, show how referendums are used to assess support for more modest 
aims. Voters were called to indicate if they support that the regional representatives use 
existing institutional means to request more autonomy from the state. 
We expect that, independent of the degree of self-determination requested, groups 
have strong incentives to use any potential means available to pressure the government 
towards granting concessions. We contend that groups pressure the state government by 
garnering support on the domestic and international levels through building civic institu-
tions as well as engaging in international diplomacy. The two following sections look into 
each of these options in turn. 
3.2. Domestic Audience 
The domestic audience is central for the success of a referendum. If the local people would 
not support the group’s claim for independence or autonomy, the whole endeavor of or-
ganizing and conducting a referendum would be nullified. Hence, the group tries to ensure 
that the local constituency supports their struggle for autonomy or independence by 
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“hard” and “soft” elements of state-building (Scheindlin, 2012, p. 66). The soft elements 
refer to constructing a shared (national) identity and sense of unity. This might include a 
flag or anthem. In this regard, the establishment of governance structures (“hard ele-
ment”) is a sustainable and functional tool, which helps to demonstrate the group’s gov-
ernmental capacities. These governance structures also help to organize a referendum, 
which needs both the mobilization of people as well as an organizational infrastructure 
(setting up ballot boxes, organizing polling stations, etc.). Mimicking state behavior domes-
tically is a rational strategy for self-determination groups in order to strengthen their 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the group audience, the national authorities, and the inter-
national community.  
But being held accountable by the civilian population for the functioning of the de-
facto state or autonomy also entails pitfalls for the group: If the group is not able to pro-
vide sufficient quality of infrastructure or equal access to economic benefits for all group-
members, the group might be hold responsible for possible political and economic short-
comings.  
Therefore, groups might decide to conduct a referendum to strengthen their internal 
sovereignty (Scheindlin, 2012, p. 67). Furthermore, it can also address the group’s local 
opponents. Given the fact that most self-determination groups do not govern unques-
tioned, but rather often face internal opposing groups, a referendum, if highly supported 
by the local people, serves as an important signal of the regional foothold of the organiza-
tion and might therefore limit the aspirations of other groups. The legitimacy granted by 
the referendum helps to silence opposition groups and underlines the unity between the 
political demands of the group and the people (Scheindlin, 2012, p. 66).  
Assuming that internal sovereignty is a necessary precondition for external sover-
eignty, then addressing the domestic audience represents a decisive element on the “se-
cessionist continuum” (Voller, 2014, p. 15).7 By demonstrating unity within the political 
community towards the central government and constructing a distinct identity than that 
of the state, the group strengthens the differences between the core state and the aspiring 
state. This is often accompanied by the building of governance structures, which might 
                                                 
7 Voller develops a continuum of secession, “in which the starting point is the emergence of the 
separatist movement engaged in a liberation struggle, and the end point is the formal independence 
and diplomatic recognition. The de facto state is an advanced stage on the continuum.” (Voller, 2014, 
p. 15). 
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parallel the state structures. By showing that the de-facto state is fully or partly able to 
organize relevant state structures, the group exerts pressure on the central government. 
We expect that, by building state-like institutions domestically, groups arebetter able 
to garner support by the group members residing in the potential sovereign territory. The 
construction and maintenance of domestic institutions, we claim, should therefore foster 
the willingness of the groups to hold a referendum over sovereignty. 
3.3. International Audience 
When do separatists receive external support? While states might plausibly provide exter-
nal support when challenges to national sovereignty undermine their adversaries and do 
not constitute a threat to regional stability and international norms, ethnic ties between 
discriminated challenger groups and external supporters are the most robust predictor of 
international involvement (Saideman, 2002). Foreign state supporters, however, are not 
the most effective influencers of claimants’ conflict strategies. Groups that employ non-
violent strategies are more likely to receive support from transnational diaspora groups 
(Petrova, 2019). International organizations also play a role in subnational challenges to 
sovereignty. The UN gets involved in nonviolent conflicts over self-determination that 
have a violent history and have the potential do diffuse regionally (White, Cunningham, & 
Beardsley, 2018).  
In order to ensure their territorial integrity, states might be reluctant to grant auton-
omy and particularly disinclined to allow independence to restive regions. At the same 
time, the territorial integrity norm alleviates the requirement to hold large territories for 
economic or security reasons (Griffiths, 2014, pp. 566-567). In order to gain governmental 
consent, groups have incentives to deliberately appeal to the international community to 
support their quest for self-determination. International support, we contend, is crucial to 
tip the balance of governmental incentive structures into the separatists’ favor. Indeed, 
secessionist rebels benefit from formal recognition by great powers in their bids for inde-
pendent statehood (Huang, 2016, pp. 102-103).  
Building on Huang (2016), we argue that groups use international diplomacy in order 
to establish relations with potential secessionism sponsors. Diplomacy is thus a means to 
communicate the competency of independent statehood in the international context 
(O’Driscoll, 2019, p. 6; Scheindlin, 2012, p. 79). Diplomatic relations facilitate communica-
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tion between groups and their (potential) sponsors, while at the same time signaling the 
capacity of a groups to act analogous to a (democratic) state in the international arena. 
Caspersen (2008) argues that democracy is an important reference point when addressing 
the international community. To involve people via direct participation is thus a decisive 
democratic process. The international travels by Scottish Prime Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
to further business and political relations with other states and regions aptly illustrate 
that would-be states take these international connections seriously. In order to generate 
support from international actors, groups refer to international norms, such as human 
rights, democracy and the right to self-determination, to underline their congruence with 
the world political system (Sienknecht 2018; 2019).  
We expect that if a group establishes diplomatic relations (e.g. successfully sending 
emissaries to relevant international actors), then a referendum becomes more likely. Via 
the establishment of foreign affairs to actors of the world political system, the group 
demonstrates its state-like behavior both internally and externally. The goal is to gain 
support and legitimacy from international actors for their cause and to ease the way for 
conducting a referendum. Strengthening the bargaining position towards the state gov-
ernment through international endorsement, we argue, is beneficial in negotiation pro-
cesses for territorial autonomy and fosters mobilization of group members for the sepa-
ratist cause. Diplomatic relations and a positive vote on the referendum can then translate 
into a better bargaining position towards the national government.  
3.4.  Scope Conditions 
We specify two scope conditions for our theory, which relate to the observation of signal-
ing attempts to target audiences, as well as the constraints to domestic and international 
acceptance of sovereignty demands.  
First, our core argument is that groups conduct self-determination referendums if 
they can rely on domestic institutions and international diplomacy, which exert pressure 
on the central government to accept the bid for autonomy or independence. Domestic in-
stitutions and international diplomacy therefore serve as signals of (potential) statehood 
to the state, domestic, and international audiences. This argument assumes that the group 
does not only send the signal, but that it is also received by the target audience, and, sub-
sequently, interpreted as intended. We make this assumption regarding all three audiences 
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to which the groups signals. We cannot assess this communicative relation in the quanti-
tative part of our data collection, but evidence from the case study allows us to trace this 
process of information exchange.   
Second, the capacity of self-determination groups to gain autonomy or independence 
through signaling is limited, even when maximal support by the domestic audience exists. 
This is, in part, because the host state has incentives to avoid its dissolution and conse-
quently seeks to avoid precedent setting (Bormann & Savun, 2018; Walter, 2006). There-
fore, effective sovereignty and control over a piece of land is insufficient for the recogni-
tion as a full state. On the other hand, conceiving of the international system as a social 
place sheds light on why “[m]ost states-to-be are socially promoted and accepted as full 
system members before their domestic-level conflicts have concluded” (Coggins, 2011, p. 
435). Would-be-states’ identification with the system, as well as their alignment with 
norms and qualities, do not guarantee recognition by a critical mass of system members. 
Recognition, Coggins shows, depends on state interests in maximizing their external secu-
rity, discouraging domestic precedent setting, and alignment with Great Power behavior. 
State preferences over the recognition of separatists are thus conditional on self-
interested motives, which stem from international power relations and, to some degree, 
domestic concerns. In this account of state birth, state interests limit the agency of subna-
tional groups in furthering their demands for sovereignty. 
4. Research Design 
We combine large scale comparative data with case study evidence, which allow us to as-
sess differences across cases as well as the internal validity of the proposed mechanism in 
an individual case. While the quantitative data allow us to gauge empirical patterns across 
cases over time, the case of the 2017 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan is an out of sample 
observation that enables us to establish external validity and trace the mechanism within 
the case. 
4.1. Dataset 
Data collection is based on Kelle (2016), who codes strategy choices, demands, and struc-
tural information on groups demanding autonomy or independence from the state for the 
period of 2005 to 2015. We extend these data backwards to 1990 using Cunningham (2014). 
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These two data sets provide a comprehensive and consistent take of the various strategies 
and characteristics of subnational groups demanding self-determination on a global scale. 
Both are based on Peace and Conflict Reports of the Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland (see, for instance, Marshall 
& Gurr, 2005), and therefore employ the same definition of self-determination groups. The 
definition of groups included in the dataset reflects a certain degree of aggregation com-
mon in the discipline. This is in line with existing datasets on ethnic and subnational 
groups, such as the Ethnic Power Relations data (Cederman et al., 2010), the Minorities at 
Risk data (Gurr, 1993), Cunningham’s data on self-determination groups (Cunningham, 
2014), or the self-determination movements data by (Sambanis, Germann, & Schädel, 
2018). While we acknowledge the potential loss of nuance incurred by aggregation, we are 
mindful of the advantages that come with jointly assessing groups that are similar on crit-
ical dimensions. We provide a list of groups in the Appendix. 
We use the end of the Cold War as an intuitive starting point for left censoring (Huang 
2016: 110). Existing work has established that international diplomacy and the methods of 
operation of the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, have changed since 
1990 (Qvortrup, 2018, p. 12). The time of analysis, 1990 to 2015, allows us to trace the dy-
namics of external support and diplomacy by separatist challengers over an extended pe-
riod of time. Our unit of analysis is the state-group-year. By integrating the two data col-
lections by Kelle and Cunningham we cover n = 3,309 observations. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the occurrence of sovereignty referendums involving the politi-
cal status of the respective self-determination group. We use the binary variable referen-
dum incidence, which is coded 1 for every year when a referendum was held in the group’s 
region regarding the reallocation of sovereignty of this unit, and 0 otherwise. The coding 
of the variable is based on Mendez and Germann (2016b), who list all referendums con-
cerned with the transfer of sovereignty rights to the subnational or supranational level 
between 1776 and 2012. We are only interested in referendums concerned with sovereign-
ty transfer from the national to the subnational level and vice versa between 1990 and 
2012, and extend the existing data to 2015 based on Qvortrup (2014a) and various second-
ary sources, ranging from news reports to academic journal articles. Sovereignty referen-
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dums are usually conducted in the region controlled by the territorially concentrated self-
determination group. 
Explanatory Variables 
The core set of explanatory variables is concerned with diplomatic action by subnational 
groups demanding self-rule. We follow Huang (2016) in distinguishing three binary com-
ponents: a foreign affairs arm, offices abroad, and the dispatch of emissaries. These three 
time-varying elements of diplomacy represent institutionalized diplomatic tools. The cod-
ing is based on the Rebel Governance Datatset by Huang (2016) and the extension of the 
dataset by Sienknecht (2019). Both datasets refer to conflicts as the unit of analysis and 
not to self-determination groups, covering conflicts until 2006. Consequently, we adjusted 
the data for all three types of diplomacy on a yearly basis backwards until 1990 and ex-
panded it until 2015 for both violent and nonviolent self-determination groups. For the 
coding, we used sources like LexisNexis, social media data of the groups, UN documents, 
and information from other datasets, such as UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017) 
and MAR (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009), as well as secondary sources. As Huang only 
refers to rebel groups in armed conflicts, we used MAROB data (Wilkenfeld, Asal, & Pate, 
2008) to close the gap between organizations and groups. All three dimensions of the di-
plomacy variable are dummy variables, coded with 1 if the group established either a for-
eign affairs arm, opened offices abroad, or sent emissaries abroad, and 0 if otherwise.  
To enhance the transparency of the coding, we provide text samples or references for 
each coding decision.8 We assume that diplomacy is critical for achieving recognition, 
which, in turn, is a crucial condition for statehood. Diplomacy strengthens bargaining 
power with the national government and fosters the mobilization of group members for 
the separatist cause. We expect that the establishment of diplomacy structures by self-
determination groups serves as a signaling tool to communicate the competencies for 
statehood to both the national and international fora, which makes the staging of a refer-
endum more likely.  
Moreover, the establishment of governance structures on the local level is decisive 
for exercising pressure on the national government. In an ongoing coding effort, we col-
                                                 
8 Extensive supplementary documentation will be made available upon publication. 
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lect data on domestic governance structures established by subnational contestants of 
state power. 
Covariates 
First, the violence variable indicates whether the group was engaged in armed conflict in a 
given year. This dummy variable is coded 1 if we observe violence involving at least 25 
battle related deaths in a given year, and 0 otherwise. From 1990 to 2004 the variable is 
taken from Cunningham (2013b), and from Kelle (2016) for 2005 to 2015. In both data 
sources, data collection is based on the UCDP Armed Conflict Database. We argue that the 
employment of armed conflict strategies undermines the state government’s willingness 
to compromise and thus reduces the likelihood of a referendum. Moreover, whether vio-
lent behavior of subnational groups is considered self-defense or an act of aggression by 
the international community greatly influences the international position towards that 
group, which might also influence the decision of the group to stage a referendum. 
Second, the independence demand variable is a binary measure indicating the scope of 
the self-determination demand in a given year. It is coded 1 if demands for independence 
are predominant, and 0 if autonomy is the central claim. For observations between 1990 
and 2004, information is based on Cunningham (2014). For 2005 to 2015, the data are tak-
en from on Kelle (2019b). We expect secessionist groups that seek to establish an inde-
pendent state to have stronger incentives to conduct a sovereignty referendum compared 
to groups with more modest goals. 
Third, we include the regime type of the state in which the group is based in the anal-
ysis. This variable is based on the Polity IV scale, that ranges from -10 to +10 (Marshall, 
Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011). We recode the variable to a binary variable, which assumes the 
value 0 if the state is an autocracy (-10 to +5 on the original scale), and 1 for democracies 
(+6 to +10). We expect that groups that are based in more democratic states have higher 
incentives to hold a referendum in order to signal their commitment to democratic norms 
and procedures. 
4.2.  Case Study – Iraqi Kurdistan 
In order to illustrate the theoretical framework that we established above, we analyze a 
representative case from the sample, Iraqi Kurdistan, and assess the proposed mechanism 
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for an out-of-sample observation: the 2017 independence referendum. We contextualize 
the analysis to the developments of the 1990s leading to the referendum. 
We argue that the decision of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) to conduct the 
referendum in 2017 was driven by three main factors: First, developments on the sub-
national level, like the political and economic discontent of the people, the desire for in-
dependence in the Kurdish population, and the growing contestation of the KRGs legitima-
cy by the Gorran-party. The referendum was used to set a sentiment of unity between the 
Kurdish populations in the areas controlled by the two main parties, KDP and PUK, and to 
underline the power of the KRG. Second, in light of the territorial gains of the Kurds in the 
aftermath of their fight against ISIS, the Kurdish authorities wanted to use their new pow-
er to pressure the Iraqi government to recognize the reality of Kurdish governmental 
structures. The third factor, which influenced the decision to stage the referendum, was 
the belief to receive support from the U.S. and other international actors in light of close 
diplomatic ties and the joint fight against ISIS.  
This representative case is well suited to assess the proposed mechanism because it is 
well documented due to the political work of Kurdish organizations and the attention the 
case received from international actors. We are therefore able to refer to different sources, 
including scholarly studies, international news articles, and historical analysis. Further-
more, we conducted interviews with experts on the Kurdish case and representatives of 
the KRG, which helps us to draw conclusions about the motivations and underlying deter-
minants that led to the referendum in 2017. If our theoretical assumptions hold true, then 
we should be able to identify an effect of the deployment of diplomatic relations on the 
staging of the referendum in 2017.  
5.  Empirical Patterns 
We assess the relation between sovereignty referendums by subnational groups and their 
international diplomacy on a global comparative scale for the period 1990 – 2015. In what 
follows we present the global comparative patterns on the core variables of interest intro-
duced in the preceding section and supplement the descriptive trends with evidence from 
our case study of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides an overview of the distribution of core variables in the dataset. Individual 
observations correspond to state-group-years. Out of the 3309 observations, 51 groups 
held a referendum between 1990 and 2015. This corresponds to 149 groups in 78 coun-
tries. A little more than half of the observations operate in a democracy, and in 60% of 
observations demands for independence are more prevalent than claims for (greater) au-
tonomy. Data on strategy choice are available for about 80% of the observations. The share 
of violent groups is relatively low. Less than 20% of the groups-years for which we have 
information are engaged in armed conflict. The variables measuring international diplo-
macy, the core explanatory variable, are available for about 90% of the observations. For-
eign affairs arms are the most common type of diplomacy, with one third of the observa-
tions maintaining governance institutions concerned with international relations. About a 
quarter of all observations establish representation abroad and an about equal number 
send ambassadors to other states. Descriptively, international diplomacy is relatively 
common amongst self-determination groups since the end of the Cold War. In an ongoing 
coding effort, we collect further information on domestic institution building. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  N min max mean SD sum
Dependent variable       
Referendum 3309 0 1 .02 .12 51 
Explanatory Variable   
Office abroad 2919 0 1 .24 .43 699 
Emissary 2919 0 1 .23 .42 671 
Foreign affairs arm  2919 0 1 .34 .47 981 
Covariates   
Violence  2704 0 1 .19 .39 504 
Independence demand 3060 0 1 .60 .49 1848 
Democracy 3309 0 1 .54 .5 1788
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5.2. Referendums 
Figure 1 maps the distribution of referendum events recorded in our data. We plot the 
average number of referendums across all groups in a given country and average this val-
ue for the period 1990 to 2015. Overall, we observe 51 referendums over the course of the 
26 years. The map shows that sovereignty referendums occur across world regions. In the 
last quarter of a century, however, most public votes over self-determination have been 
conducted in democratic regimes, with about 70% of the observations. The 2006 referen-
dum of Armenians in Azerbaijan is an example of a referendum over subnational sover-
eignty held in an autocratic state.9 A few states have seen multiple referendums over 
time, sometimes by the same group. This includes Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Philippines. In the United Kingdom, for in-
stance, both Wales and Scotland held autonomy referendums in 1997, while Scotland held 
an independence referendum in 2014.  
 
Figure 1: Average number of referendums by country over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Azerbaijan is assigned a value of -7 for the year 2006 in the Polity2 score (Marshall et al., 2011). 
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While the map shows the average over time by country, assessing variation across 
groups also provides valuable insight. In some of the groups in our data no referendum 
was ever held in the period of analysis, while in others one, two, or more referendums are 
conducted. The maximum number of referendums by a group in the sample is three. These 
cases include, for instance, Catalans in Spain and South Ossetians in Georgia. With about 
three-quarters of the groups never experiencing a referendum, this category is the most 
common of the three. Conducting a referendum – either unilaterally or with governmental 
approval – is thus no matter of course. Rather, we claim that those groups holding refer-
endums are qualitatively different from those not having a public vote. These differences 
might lie in a particularly high degree of organizational and mobilization capacity, an ac-
commodative central government, or favorable opportunity structures. The divergence in 
capacity and institutional setup when moving from zero to one or more referendums is 
therefore not linear. This also applies to the categories of one and two or more referen-
dums. Those groups conducting two or more referendums are likely systematically differ-
ent from those that get to vote only once. The former might either be engaged in a long-
term devolution process involving public votes, such as Scotland, or be determined in 
spite of an unaccommodating central government, such as Iraqi Kurdistan. 
In Iraqi Kurdistan, President Masoud Barzani announced a referendum on the inde-
pendence of Kurdistan from Iraq in 2014, but postponed it after a request by the former 
U.S. Foreign Minister John Kerry to wait until after the defeat of ISIS. The Kurds concurred 
and after ISIS had been beaten back by the U.S.-led coalition, they held a unilateral refer-
endum in 2017 on the question of secession from the Iraqi state. The population of the 
Federate State of Kurdistan, as well as the Kurds living in disputed areas, were eligible to 
vote. President Masoud Barzani announced that the immediate goal of the referendum was 
to start a negotiation process with the Iraqi government about independence, but he 
stopped short of actually declaring that a positive outcome would trigger Kurdish inde-
pendence from Iraq (Kaplan, 2019, p. 35). An overwhelming majority of the population vot-
ed in favor of a separation from Iraq (92% voted yes with a voter turnout of 70%).  
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5.3.  Diplomacy 
We argue that international diplomacy by subnational groups is a crucial tool to gain sup-
port by the international community. The goal is to exert pressure on the national gov-
ernment to grant concessions to the restive separatists. Figure 2 summarizes the distribu-
tion of referendums across types of international diplomacy. Note that the three diploma-
cy variables are not available for all observations. Three referendum events are therefore 
missing from this figure10. In this cross case setting we find limited variation across ob-
servations holding referendums and those not staging public votes. In the years where 
referendums were held, groups maintain offices abroad and send emissaries abroad 
slightly more frequently than in the absence of referendums. Foreign affairs arms, how-
ever, are somewhat more frequent in the latter case. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of International Diplomacy by Referendum Incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International diplomacy plays a crucial role in the Kurdish context. Since 1992, the Iraqi 
Kurds maintained diplomatic relations with a variety of international actors. Both Barzani 
and Talabani made several diplomatic visits to different heads of state (McDowall, 2004, p. 
                                                 
10 The three events are referendums in Crimea in 1991, 1994 and 2014. 
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385). In 1994, they opened offices in Turkey and gradually expanded their representations 
to a network of 14 offices all over the world. In 2015, the Iraqi Kurds had established rep-
resentation in several Western countries (www.dfr.gov.krd), of which the offices in Ger-
many, France, and the U.S. are regarded as the most important ones by the Kurdish au-
thorities (Interview A). The KRG established the Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) in 
September 2006 to conduct relations with the international community. Today, the DFR is 
an integral part of the Kurdish government, with a wide-ranging portfolio of responsibili-
ties.  
In order to generate support from international actors, the Kurdish authorities con-
sistently referred to international norms such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law. The goal was to emphasize their congruence with the world political system (Inter-
view B) and their character as a democratic society. The Kurds labelled themselves as the 
sole democratic entity in the Middle East that takes international norms seriously. They 
frame themselves as democratic and reliable partners in a troubled Middle East and as the 
natural partner for Western alliances. With this westernized identity construction, the 
Kurds tried to draw a clear boundary between themselves and the Iraqi government, and 
neighboring states alike.  
The perceived success of this effort was confirmed when the Kurds collaborated with 
the U.S. led coalition fighting ISIS. The Peshmerga was the most important military unit in 
Iraq with fighting experience and a functioning organizational structure. The joint fight 
against ISIS, the postponed referendum in 2014 as a reaction to the request of the U.S., and 
the strong diplomatic relations to international supporters made the Kurdish authorities 
believe that their supporters would also back their push for independence.  
 Diplomatic relations and international support were a crucial factor in deciding to 
hold the referendum in 2017 (Interview A). While ISIS was almost defeated, the Kurds as-
sumed that the referendum should take place before international attention would vanish. 
However, with the exception of Israel, the international community unanimously opposed 
the referendum and argued for a unified State of Iraq. Despite the Kurdish authorities be-
ing aware of the missing support from their Western allies, they chose to conduct the ref-
erendum anyway. The interviews clearly show that the KRG at least considered that the 
U.S. and other allies would tolerate the status quo (meaning the territorial gains of the 
Kurds after fighting ISIS) and prevent an escalation with Baghdad (Interview A, B, C). Some 
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analysts have argued that the KRG has overestimated the effects of its lobbying in Western 
states and trusted those who provided a distorted picture of international support for 
Kurdish independence (Kaplan, 2019: 37).  
The Kurdish case falls in line with our finding that there is a higher probability of a 
referendum if a group sends emissaries abroad or establishes a foreign affairs arm. 
Somewhat puzzling, the quantitative analysis suggests that a referendum becomes less 
likely when the group maintains offices abroad. The case study did not shed any light on 
this finding and leaves ample room for future research in this direction. Furthermore, the 
subnational situation and a possible contestation of power should be taken into account in 
a further study. It is conceivable that the decision to stage a referendum might also be 
influenced by internal struggles for legitimacy and power.   
5.4. Domestic Institutions 
Alongside international diplomacy, we argue, the establishment of domestic institutions is 
key for understanding why self-determination groups conduct sovereignty referendums. 
Since 1991, Kurdish parties had favored a federal system, in which they could govern a 
certain territory (Jongerden, 2019, p. 65). In the same year, Kurdish parties joined the US-
backed Iraqi National Congress (INC) and organized elections for a provisional parliament. 
In 1992, the Kurdish parliament called for a Federated State of Kurdistan within a demo-
cratic parliamentary Iraq, although the elections were framed as illegitimate by the Iraqi 
government (Bengio, 2012, p. 202 f.). The Kurdish elections in 1992 fulfilled functions on 
two different levels: On the one hand, they conferred legitimacy on the Kurdish leadership 
and stabilized the Kurdish administration against opposing Kurdish organizations. On the 
other hand, the elections signaled to the international community that the majority of the 
Kurdish population supported the Kurdish government. 
The Kurdistan National Assembly formed a Kurdish cabinet, which included fifteen 
ministries, including a ministry for military affairs. Three Kurdish governors were ap-
pointed to the provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyya, and Duhok. This paralleling of state struc-
tures addressed also the legal and educational system. A court of appeals was established 
in 1992; and huge investments were made for the renewal of the educational system (Ben-
gio, 2012, p. 203). By the end of 1992, the governance structures of the Kurdish authorities 
had materialized. 
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In the aftermath of the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurdistan 
Autonomous Region was officially acknowledged as a federal part of Iraq in the Iraqi Con-
stitution (2005).  
5.5. Regime Type 
Our argument states that conducting a referendum often follows the establishment of for-
eign relations. This argument accounts for the incidence of referendums, but not for their 
timing. We contend that the existing regime type is critical to account for the timing of 
referendum votes for sovereignty. In democratizing states, the reference to democratic 
values becomes more salient, while subnational contenders are increasingly aggrieved due 
to the lack of democratic concessions by the central government. Referendums are often 
held where politicians face electoral discontent, centered on insufficient legitimacy of 
their decision making (Qvortrup, 2014a, p. 46). Figure 3 plots the distribution of referen-
dums between 1990 and 2015, distinguishing between democratic and non-democratic 
states. Of the 51 referendums in the data, 30 are held in democracies and 21 in non-
democracies. While we consistently observe referendums in democracies over time, the 
early 1990s show a spikes in the frequency of votes in non-democracies, which is related 
to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
 
Figure 3: Referendum Events by Regime Type, 1990 to 2015 
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In terms of democratization, the Iraqi regime improved since the fall of Saddam Hus-
sein. However, due to continuous violence between different fractions in the country and 
the oppression of the Sunnis and Kurds by the central government, Iraq scores “3” on the 
polity index from 2010 until 2013, which describes an “anocracy” (a mixed authority re-
gime). In 2014, the score improved to “6”, signifying a democratic regime. Indeed, the data 
show an improvement in the democratic nature of the Iraqi government. The decision to 
stage a referendum by the Kurdish authorities falls in line with the democratization of 
Iraq and the goal of demonstrating the democratization of the KRG and its followers. Inter-
estingly, Kurdish officials described the developments in Iraq as a move towards an illib-
eral and suppressive regime, rather than towards democracy. According to our interviews, 
the political developments in Iraq and the perceived move towards autocracy, especially 
under Premier Minister Nuri al-Maliki who furthered the suppression of Kurdish and Sun-
ni minorities, influenced the decision to conduct the referendum (Interview A, Interview 
B). Furthermore, the old parties, KDP and PUK, faced a contestation of their legitimacy by 
the emergence of a new party, Gorran. Gorran finished second in the Iraqi Kurdistan par-
liamentary elections in 2009 and 2013, thereby challenging the authority of the KRG. 
Some analysists state that the staging of the referendum in 2014 was a reaction to the 
strengthening of the new party and an attempt to distract from questions about the legit-
imacy of the KRG (O’Driscoll, 2019). 
While the case stresses the importance of the perceived change of access to political 
representation, it also shows that the relationship between regime types that are in flux 
and the staging of referendums should be analyzed in more detail. This refers especially to 
the difference between a regime change perceived by the group and a de facto regime 
change. Both in the case of Catalonia as well as Kurdistan, groups perceived a shift towards 
more autocratic structures before they conducted their referendums. 
6.  Future Research 
We offer the first study to systematically assess the repercussions of the signaling by 
groups demanding autonomy or independence from the state towards the international 
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community and their domestic audiences. This allows us to link different levels of analy-
sis, which are usually considered separately in the relevant literature. In a nutshell, we 
argue that referendums fulfill different functions on different levels for the groups’ aim 
for independence: First, it legitimizes the groups’ claim for greater autonomy or inde-
pendence by including the broader public (domestic audience level). Second, it shows the 
government the determination of the groups’ case (state audience). Third, it helps to signal 
to the international community the group’s high regard of democratic values (internation-
al audience). We argued that the establishment of governance structures on the subnation-
al level and the development of diplomacy structures towards international actors fulfill 
complementary functions. While groups build up governance structures to secure domes-
tic support by group members, they conduct international diplomacy in search of external 
support. Both strategies make their quest for autonomy or independence more likely. We 
present a first glimpse at new global comparative data on different diplomatic tools em-
ployed by subnational groups between 1990 and 2015. The combination of evidence from a 
global sample of self-determination groups and a case study of the 2017 referendum in 
Iraqi Kurdistan allow us to trace the relation between diplomacy and referendums both 
within and across cases. 
Several issues remain for future research, some of which we address in passing in 
this study. First, while we assess the regime type in which groups operate in the global 
comparative analysis, the case study suggests that changes in the institutional and proce-
dural setup of the host state might be critical in accounting for the strategic situation of 
subnational contenders. By staging separatist referenda, subnational groups arguably sig-
nal to the international community that they are state-like entities and are thus worthy of 
support and solidarity. We assume that this is particularly true in democratizing states, 
where separatist groups and the respective government are engaged in a “democratization 
race”. At the same time, it is plausible that subnational groups would also conduct a refer-
endum to underline their democratic character in the face of a government that is sliding 
into autocracy. What both cases have in common is that the government regimes are in 
flux, which opens political leeway for the subnational group. 
Second, our approach to diplomatic action by subnational self-determination groups 
focuses on institutionalized and official forms of diplomatic interaction with international 
actors. Diplomats represent the officially sanctioned account of events. Unofficial chan-
nels, on the other hand, might be more promising in delicate situations, for instance 
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when, for security reasons, an agreement with the subnational challenger in an autocratic 
regime is prioritized. As we are interested in the visible signaling function of diplomacy, 
the official channels are of the greatest interest to us. In future work, assessing unofficial 
networks may, however, shed more light on the relevance of different types of interna-
tional ties that self-determination groups engage in. 
Third, we focus on diplomatic action to assess groups’ capacity to signal eligibility for 
membership in the international system through their adherence to democratic norms 
and procedures. A systematic assessment of domestic governance structures that groups 
establish on their territory will help us to shed light on how these institutions create le-
gitimacy and garnering support for the bid for self-determination domestically. At the 
same time, these structures plausibly constitute an alternative means of signaling the 
capacity of the region to fulfill state functions towards the central government as well as 
the international community. The case of Iraqi Kurdistan suggests that the domestic insti-
tutions in Iraqi Kurdistan are central for a shared Kurdish identity and the support of the 
local people. At the same time, dissatisfaction of the (younger) people with career oppor-
tunities and general economic development emerged. Furthermore, challenging local po-
litical developments, such as the success of the Gorran party, were addressed by the KRG 
when conducting a referendum. In light of this, the referendum can also be seen as a way 
for the KRG to demonstrate its unity with the local constituency and to distract from prob-
lems on the ground. The quest for independence mobilizes the population along a meta-
level and helps to cover possible economic and political shortcomings and problems.  
Fourth, not all referendums are officially sanctioned by the state government. Unilat-
eral referendums are more likely in situations where governments are not willing to ac-
commodate the subnational challengers, for instance if the referendum outcome is per-
ceived as a threat towards national level power. Bilaterally agreed referendums, on the 
other hand, are plausibly more likely in situations where self-determination groups are 
more likely to be accommodated through institutional means in the first place, or where 
the expected outcome of the referendum is not perceived as a threat by the central gov-
ernment. In the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, a unilateral referendum was conducted, which – in 
the end – put the KRG in a worse position than before the referendum. The Iraqi govern-
ment, under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (2014-2018), forcefully took back the Kurdish 
territorial gains, which were made during the conflict with ISIS. This included the city of 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories, as well as the oil fields, which also had economic 
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consequences. “Essentially the Kurds lost all the gains they made from 2003 and went 
from a relatively strong negotiating position with Baghdad prior to the referendum to a 
position of weakness, which has been compounded by internal Kurdish division” 
(O’Driscoll & Baser, 2019, p. 11).  
Fifth, combining a quantitative comparative analysis and a qualitative case study 
helps us to understand under what conditions subnational groups use referendums as a 
political tool and which role the establishment of diplomacy structures play in this regard. 
This combination of methods allows us to directly address an important concern with the 
argument and research design. It might be argued that issues with endogeneity arise from 
the possibility that referendums are more likely where there is more external support for 
independence. While this argument is theoretically plausible, our qualitative evidence 
uncovers little empirical evidence in favor of this notion. The case of Iraqi Kurdistan 
shows that the referendum was conducted in spite of low support rates, and the explicit 
advice against the referendum by their ally, the U.S. Counterexamples exist: The 2011 ref-
erendum on the independence of South Sudan was administered by the UN as part of the 
peace process. The interplay between the national and international level needs more 
elaboration. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Interviews (February 2019 – September 2019) 
Interview Base/Date Description 
A Berlin, 
15.05.2019 
Representative of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government
B Berlin, 
20.02.2019 
Expert on Iraqi Kurdistan 
C Washington, 
16.09.2019 
Representative of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government
 
 
Table A2: Groups and Referendums in the Dataset 
Country Group 
Time peri-
od in samp-
le 
Refe-
rendum 
Referendum 
year 
Afghanistan Tajiks 1990 2015 0 
Afghanistan Uzbek 1990 2015 0 
Algeria Berbers 1990 2015 0 
Angola Bakongo 2005 2015 0 
Angola Cabindans 1990 2015 0 
Australia Aborigines 1990 2015 0 
Azerbaijan Armenians 1991 2015 1 1991, 2006
Azerbaijan Lezgins 1991 2015 0 
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tribes 1990 2015 0 
Belgium Fleming 1990 2015 0 
Belgium Walloon 1990 2015 0 
Bhutan Ethnic Nepalese/Lhotshampas 1990 2015 0 
Bolivia Aymara 1990 2015 1 2009
Bolivia Quechua 1990 2015 1 2009
Bosnia Bosnian Serbs 1992 2015 1 1993, 1994
Bosnia Croats 1992 2015 1 2000
Brazil Amazonian Indians 1990 2015 0 
Burma Arakanese/Rohingya 1990 2015 0 
Burma Kachins 1990 2015 0 
Burma Karenni 1990 2005 0 
Burma Karens 1990 2015 0 
Burma Mons 1990 2015 0 
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Burma Shan 1990 2015 0 
Burma Wa 1990 2015 0 
Burma Zomis/Chins 1990 2015 0 
Cameroon 
Westerner/Anglophone/Southern 
Cameroons 1990 2015 1 1995
Canada Indigenous 1990 2015 1 1992, 1995
Canada Quebecois 1990 2015 1 1995
Chad Southerners 1990 2015 0 
Chile Indigenous peoples 1990 2015 0 
China Mongolian 1990 2015 0 
China Tibetans 1990 2015 0 
China Uygur 1990 2015 0 
Colombia Indigenous peoples 1990 2015 0 
Croatia Serbs 1991 2015 1 1993
Cyprus Turks 1990 2015 1 2004
DRC Lunda-Yeke 1990 2015 0 
Djibouti Afar 1990 2015 0 
Ecuador 
Lowland (Amazonian) Indigenous 
Peoples 1990 2015 1 2000
Equatorial 
Guinea Bube/Bubi 1990 2015 0 
Ethiopia Afar 1990 2015 0 
Ethiopia Eritreans 1990 1993 1 1993
Ethiopia Oromo 1990 2015 0 
Ethiopia Somali (Ogaden) 1990 2015 0 
Finland Saami 1990 2005 0 
France Basques 1990 2015 0 
France Bretons 1990 2015 0 
France Corsicans 1990 2015 1 2003
Georgia Abkhazians 1991 2015 1 1999
Georgia Adzhars 1991 2015 0 
Georgia Ossetians (South) 1991 2015 1 1992, 2001, 2006
India Assamese 1990 2015 0 
India Bodos/Kachari 1990 2015 0 
India Kashmiri Muslims 1990 2015 0 
India Mizos/Lushai 1990 2015 0 
India Nagas 1990 2015 0 
India Scheduled Tribes of East India 2005 2015 0 
India Scheduled Tribes of North India 2005 2015 0 
India 
Scheduled Tribes of Northeast In-
dia 2005 2015 0 
India Scheduled Tribes of South India 2005 2015 0 
India Scheduled Tribes of West India 2005 2015 0 
India Sikhs 1990 2015 0 
India Tripuras 1990 2015 0 
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Indonesia Aceh 1990 2015 0 
Indonesia Dayaks 2005 2015 0 
Indonesia East Timorese 1990 1999 1 1999
Indonesia Papuans 1990 2015 0 
Iran Kurds 1990 2015 0 
Iraq Kurds 1990 2015 0 
Israel Palestinian 1990 2015 0 
Italy Sardinians 1990 2015 1 2001
Italy South Tyrolians 1990 2015 1 2001
Kazakhstan Russians 1991 2005 0 
Kyrgyzstan Uzbek 1991 2015 0 
Laos Hmong 1990 2005 0 
Lebanon Palestinians 2005 2015 0 
Macedonia Albanians 1991 2015 0 
Mali Touareg 1990 2015 0 
Mexico Mayans 2005 2015 0 
Mexico Other indigenous 2005 2015 0 
Mexico Zapotecs 2005 2015 0 
Moldova Gagauz 1991 2015 1 1991, 1995
Moldova Slavs 1991 2015 0 
Montenegro Albanian 2006 2015 0 
Morocco Saharawis 1990 2015 0 
Namibia East Caprivians/Lozi 1990 2015 0 
Nicaragua Indigenous peoples 1990 2015 0 
Niger Tuareg 1990 2015 0 
Nigeria Ibo 1990 2015 0 
Nigeria Ijaw 1990 2015 0 
Nigeria Ogoni 1990 2015 0 
Nigeria Yoruba 1990 2015 0 
Norway Saami 1990 2005 0 
Pakistan Baluchis 1990 2015 0 
Pakistan Pashtuns (Pushtuns) 1990 2015 0 
Pakistan Seraiki/Saraiki 1990 2015 0 
Pakistan Sindhi 1990 2015 0 
Papua New 
Guinea Bougainvilleans 1990 2005 0 
Peru Lowland indigenous 1990 2015 0 
Philippines Igorots 1990 2015 1 1990, 1998
Philippines Muslim Malay 1990 2015 1 2001
Romania Hungarian 1990 2015 1 2006
Russia Avars 2005 2015 0 
Russia Buryats 1991 2015 0 
Russia Chechens 1991 2015 0 
Russia Kumyk 1991 2015 1 1992
Russia Lezgins 1991 2015 0 
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Russia Tatar/Tartar 1991 2015 1 1992
Russia Yakuts 1991 2015 0 
Senegal Jola/Diola 1990 2015 0 
Slovakia Hungarian 1990 2015 0 
Somalia Isaaq 1990 2005 0 
Somalia Puntland Darods 1990 2005 0 
South Africa Afrikaner 1990 2015 0 
South Africa Khoisan 1990 2005 0 
South Africa Zulu 1990 2015 0 
Spain Basques 1990 2015 0 
Spain Catalans 1990 2015 1 2006, 2009, 2014
Sri Lanka Moor/Muslims 1990 2015 0 
Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Tamils 1990 2015 0 
Sudan Darfur Black Muslims 2005 2015 0 
Sudan Nuba 1990 2015 0 
Sudan Southern Sudanese 1990 2011 1 2011
Sweden Saami 1990 2005 0 
Switzerland Jurassians 1990 2005 0 
Taiwan Aborigine 1990 2015 0 
Tanzania Zanzibar Africans/Shirazi 2005 2015 0 
Tanzania Zanzibar Arabs 2005 2015 0 
Thailand Malay-Muslims 1990 2015 0 
Turkey Kurds 1990 2015 0 
Uganda Baganda 1990 2015 0 
UK Catholics in Northern Ireland 1990 2015 1 1998
UK Scots 1990 2015 1 1997, 2014
Ukraine Crimean Russians 1991 2015 1 1991, 1994, 2014
Ukraine Crimean Tatars/Tartars 1991 2015 1 1991, 1994, 2014
USA Native American 1990 2015 0 
USA Native Hawaiian 1990 2015 1 1996
USA Puerto Ricans 1990 2005 0 
Uzbekistan Tajiks 1991 2015 0 
Vietnam Montagnards/Degar/Highlanders 1990 2015 0 
Yugoslavia Albanians 1990 1991 0 
Yugoslavia Croats 1990 1991 1 1991
Yugoslavia Hungarians 1990 1991 0 
Yugoslavia Kosovar Albanians 1990 2006 1 1991
Yugoslavia Montenegrins 1990 2006 1 1992, 2006
Yugoslavia Sandzak Muslims 1990 1991 1 1991
Yugoslavia Slovenes 1990 1991 1 1990
Zambia Lozi 1990 2015 0 
Zimbabwe Ndebele 1990 2015 0 
 
